Make the reset un-social-engineerable.
Your platform executes the most attacked action in enterprise security: the credential reset. Manav gates it on a fresh signature from the employee’s own enrolled device — the caller with three of four identifiers and a perfect story still can’t produce it.
The receipt below was signed and checked in this tab, with zero network calls.
Cryptographic fields
cost of the M&S / Co-op intrusions. Initial access: social-engineering the help desk.
Clorox’s suit against its help-desk vendor — credentials reset “simply by asking.”
Scattered Spider doesn’t break your customer’s IAM — it calls the help desk and asks. The agent is charming, informed, and holds the employee’s date of birth, manager and last ticket. Verification questions fail because the answers are for sale. The only thing the caller cannot buy is a signature from the real employee’s enrolled device.
Three integration points. Your brand, our receipt.
// Before the consequential action, from your backend: const receipt = await manav.sign({ action: 'admin.mfa_reset', payload: { user, requestedBy, ticket }, approver: employee.principal, assurance: 'passkey+liveness', }); if (receipt.ceremony === 'completed') proceed(receipt.id); // Anyone verifies the receipt offline against our published JWKS — forever.
Run the ceremony yourself. Then try to fake it.
A controlled sandbox of the exact flow above — your system asks, the enrolled human signs on their own device, a receipt is issued, and you attack it. Real Ed25519, in this tab, nothing sent anywhere.
A 30-minute integration conversation.
Bring the flow in your product where this belongs. We’ll run the ceremony on it and hand you a receipt you can verify yourself before the call ends — and a straight answer on what an embed looks like commercially.